Exploring feasibility of novel approaches  – A Delphi study

Exploring feasibility of novel approaches – A Delphi study

The team from ESSRG, overseeing the policy work package in Contracts2.0, conducted a Delphi-survey to highlight limitations of the current agri-environmental schemes as well as to gauge the perception of innovative approaches for the delivery of public goods amongst policy makers, farmers/advisors, researchers and NGO’s across Europe.

The Delphi method is based on structured expert surveys and draws on experiences and knowledge of the participants in form of empirical, predictive and normative aspects. Its core concept is to facilitate discussions and develop consensual ideas among participants via several correlated rounds allowing experts to reconsider their opinion in each round.

It is planned to run altogether three rounds of the Delphi survey, to assess the knowledge base and to stimulate a discussion regarding the adoption of innovative contractual solutions for a farmer- and eco -friendly agriculture. The first round of the survey, conducted in March/April 2021, was completed by 41 stakeholders form 17 European countries. The aim was to first depict the limitations of current agri-environmental schemes, followed by an assessment of the knowledge base and experiences regarding the four novel approaches being at the heart of contracts2.0: results-based payments, collective action as well as value chain and land tenure approaches. In the following some of the results are summarized:

Limitations of the current schemes are evident

Regarding the limitations the results suggest, that financial (e.g. transaction cost, compensation vs. reward) and institutional (e.g. bureaucracy, lack of flexibility) factors are the most relevant. But knowledge-related aspects (e.g. lack of robust scientific evidence, limited access to advisory services) as well as the need for improved monitoring and regional differentiation were also mentioned as hindering an effective implementation of agri-environmental measures.

Results- vs. action-based payments

Concerning the innovative approaches, results-based payments were perceived as potentially (highly) effective in achieving the ecological objectives (especially biodiversity related) due to the agreement of clear and measurable outcomes. Respondents highlighted that rewarding farmers for their environmental performance (instead of compensating for their lost income or increased costs) contributes to the attractiveness of this approach. While the increased flexibility and autonomy for farmers are additional advantages, issues like monitoring (e.g. definition of robust indicators, use of IT or farmers expertise to bring down cost) and risk mitigation (uncertainty due to external factors) still pose a challenge and need some further attention when refining/adapting this approach. Many respondents state that setting up such schemes would require initially large investments (management, monitoring, trainings), which might serve as a barrier for the adoption. As a potential middle ground some experts suggest a combination of results-based payment as a bonus on top of an action-based implementation to reward more ambitious efforts.

Collective Action

Many respondents agreed that the collective approach (or group contracts) can effectively deliver on the (mostly biodiversity related) objectives when adequate ecological expertise is involved. The main argument in favor of cooperation is the positive effect on the connectivity of habitats through a coordinated management of suitable measures on landscape scale. The decreased (real or perceived) transaction cost on the farmers’ side is another advantage. While some respondents argue a long-lived tradition with cooperation amongst farmers helps to succeed when collectively implementing measures, others highlight the importance of a feeling of trust within a collective and/or contractual elements for regulating individual behavior being the key factors for success. Regarding the transaction cost of the collective approach respondents acknowledge a shift from public transaction cost (administrations) to the private sector (mainly the collective itself or their management respectively).

Value chain approach

The value chain approach is well received by most respondents, since it seems well suited to reward farmers for their environmental performance, independently from public funding. The generation of income through an adequate market price is also more in line with farmers’ business logic (instead of relying on public funds). This approach seems to work well with shorter value chains and a more regionalized marketing, while large retailers do often not engage so easily in such programs. A key factor of this approach is the labeling of the extra effort to simplify the decision to purchase for the environmentally conscious customers. Given the already large variety of labels, special attention needs to be paid to a transparent and clear communication of the environmental performance throughout the value chain. Respondents recognize no significant (institutional, cultural or social) barriers to implement this approach, however it is perceived to require an extensive infrastructure and a broad knowledge base.

Land tenure contracts

The Land tenure approach is the one with the most uncertainty among the respondents, possibly due to a potential lack of experience with this type of contract. It could be a well-suited approach for large landowners, especially when intermediaries (National Parks, Church, NGO’s) are involved. The comparatively longer contract periods of land-tenure approaches not only contributes to the environmental effectiveness but also benefits the farmer by provided a sound and predictable financial base, where uncertainty and risks are comparatively low.

How does the ideal contract look like?

The last block of the survey addressed the question of the ideal contract. Interestingly the (assumed) most effective type of contracts across all respondents were by far the publicly funded agri-environmental scheme (AES). Regarding the characteristics of a contract the opinions differ a bit more. Bi-laterally agreed and publicly funded contracts with a flexible length and a mix of results- and action-based payments earned the highest approval rate. Although the results of this survey are far from being representative, the glimpse into the minds of different stakeholder groups involved with the discussion of agricultural policy issues, has provided us with some valuable insights. Especially the open-ended questions have generated a rich pool of ideas, to guide us on our path towards the development of contractual solutions that benefit farmers and nature. The third and last round of the Delphi will be completed in September 2021.

For a more detailed and comprehensive interpretation of the results check out this report.

Figure 2. Differences of the characteristics of the ideal contract according to the background of the respondents. Source: own compilation based on the 1st round of the Delphi survey.

Visualizing future farming in the Dutch case studies

Visualizing future farming in the Dutch case studies

The Contract Innovation Labs in the Netherlands worked with an illustrator to produce a visual representation of the “dream farming landscape”, an imagined ideal future for the landscape and its agricultural landuse practices. This tool is used by the Innovation Labs to have a point of departure for identifying the changes that need to happen to make this vision a reality. In this blogpost, BoerenNatuur shares their experience with the process of developing a shared vision of the ideal future of farming.

Written by Lisa Deijl (BoerenNatuur)

Presenting the Dutch case: the collective contract

The Dutch case in Contracts2.0 is unique because it revolves around the only nation-wide fully implemented collective contract-model for nature conservation by farmers in the world. In the Netherlands, since 2016, this collective contract was set up by farmers and the national and provincial governments. Now, there are 40 collectives of 11.000 farmers who carry out this subsidy scheme for nature conservation. BoerenNatuur is the national umbrella organization of the 40 collectives, and the action partner in Contracts2.0. You can read more about what we do here:

As an action partner we are excited to be able to have the opportunity to study, together with research partners from around Europe, how the collective contracts are working and what improvements can be made. These questions we aim to answer in the Contract Innovation Labs.

Setting up Contract Innovation Labs

Just like the other Contracts2.0 actionpartners in 9 European countries, BoerenNatuur established a Contract Innovation Lab in the Netherlands. The Dutch Innovation Lab gathers people that have expertise with this contract model from working as a practitioner in the agricultural sector. In the case of our Labs, these are farmers and employees of the farmers collectives or nature organizations.  Because BoerenNatuur is the national umbrella organization of the 40 local collectives, we chose to organize not one but two Innovation Labs in order to get more insight in what different challenges the collective approach meets in different parts of the country. The Labs are located in Limburg (the south of the Netherlands, an area with varied land use and the biggest collective with the most budget and the most members) and in Oost-Groningen (the north of the Netherlands, an area with mostly arable agriculture and a smaller collective). To successfully set up the Innovation Labs within Contracts2.0 and engage local stakeholders, we received a great amount of help from the local collectives Natuurrijk Limburg (NaLi) and Agrarische Natuurvereniging Oost-Groningen (ANOG).

Visualizing the “dream farming landscape” in the Innovation Labs

The end goal of the work in Contracts2.0 Innovation Labs is to make policy suggestions for improved contracts. Formulating an ideal future for the farming landscape is a step towards this, as it helps to pinpoint the changes that stakeholders would like to see. But the process began with analysing the here and now: by carrying out a SWOT-analysis of the contracts under investigation. With all the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats laid out, we had a basis to start imagining the ideal future, the “dream landscape”. It was a very interesting process to try to come up with a coherent view for the local landscape in 2040, especially since there were different actors involved. After a while we were able to come up with a description of the dream landscape in 300 words, that everyone felt comfortable with.

It was then that Lenny van Bussel, our research partner from Wageningen University, suggested that we hire an illustrator to visualize the text describing the agreed upon dream landscape features. We thought it would be a nice gesture to the local stakeholders, to have a tangible product from this project that they had been working on. However, when the picture was presented to the groups, it turned out that people actually still had varying opinions. Apparently, words had hidden the different visions, but an actual visual rendition of the dream landscape drew them out again!

Keeping the conversation going

The reignited debate on the dream landscape in our Contract Innovation Labs was an unexpected result for us organizers. It showed us that working with the illustrator could have been a whole different path to explore when developing the shared vision of the dream landscape. We chose to make some small adjustments to the paintings, but did not aim for a ‘picture perfect’ vision, because this could have taken several more sessions. Instead we approach the visuals as a ‘praatplaat’ (a Dutch word for ‘a picture to use as basis for discussion’). This tool can help us in the discussions around the ideal future landscape and how to get there, especially when we engage with policy makers.

Local and regional policy makers have been involved in the SWOT-analysis of the current contract. However, they have not yet had the chance to react to the CIL’s dream landscape visualization. In the coming months, we will give them the opportunity to do so. First, we will present the visions in separate Policy Innovation Labs to inquire about the chances for the realization of the dream farming landscape. Secondly, over the summer, we hope to be able to organize ‘in person’ workshops in the respective regions with practitioners and policy makers , to present the results of the work  we did. We hope that these last workshops serve as an inspiration for local actors to continue working together also beyond the boundaries of this project, and to continue to keep the conversation going.

Collective grazing contracts in the Pyrénées’ highlands

Collective grazing contracts in the Pyrénées’ highlands

On April 16, 2021, our Contract Innovation Lab (CIL) and Policy Innovation Lab (PIL) in the French Pyrenees concluded the first round of workshops to find a shared vision for feasible contracts (“dream contract”) for collective grazing in the Occitane region. Researchers from CIRAD discussed viable contract models with land managers, local farmers, shepherds, pastoral and environmental experts, and policy experts.

The workshop results suggest a strong preference for developing the subsidiarity principle in collective contract definition and implementation and for promoting local knowledge by creating working groups that bring together various from pastoral territories.

The participants agree that identifying relevant environmental public goods should not result from a top-down approach but instead from a shared understanding of local ecological and pastoral challenges. These are to be defined and prioritized locally for each summer pasture by the working group following a shared ecological and pastoral diagnosis. Management plans will then be co-edited to specify appropriate sustainable pastoral practices and suitable indicators to base contractual engagements. The working group monitors the evolution of each situation and adapts collective grazing rules accordingly. Annual follow-up meetings will be held to report each pasture’s condition and potential management adaptations.

Public goods games to investigate farmer cooperation

Public goods games to investigate farmer cooperation

In the Netherlands the coordination of agri-environmental schemes (AES) is organized exclusively through 40 collectives across the country. Other EU-member states show great interest in this model. However, little is known about farmers’ willingness to cooperate. Therefore, to shed light on this issue, Contracts2.0 carried out a field experiment with 300 German farmers. So far, preliminary results suggest that farmers are more likely to cooperate than expected.

To study the dynamics between self-interest and cooperation among farmers, public goods games were used. Here, farmers received a sum of money to split between a private and a group account. Giving money into the group account is in the collective interest but at odds with individual interests, on the other hand. Pinpointing the optimal social solution did lead to the largest monetary contribution to the group account even though experts predicted differently (see figure).

So far, the  public goods games have presented itself as extremely useful. Researchers and policy makers can easily draw on this application-friendly analytical tool for understanding collaborative behavior. Concrete field implementation as well as results will follow in the coming weeks.