Collective Action for Biodiversity – Update  from Innovation Lab NRW

Collective Action for Biodiversity – Update from Innovation Lab NRW

The Innovation Lab North Rhine-Westphalia (IL NRW) focuses on developing the theoretical underpinnings of a concept featuring the collective approach for the implementation of agri-environmental measures (AEM). This article sums up the development in the IL NRW, discusses the main barriers of the current system and outlines the challenges regarding a potential application of the collective approach in Germany.

German Version/Deutsche Fassung

Collective Approach in Focus

The Innovation Lab NRW (IL NRW) gathers various stakeholders in regular meetings to discuss the way forward towards a more attractive and more effective funding scheme for voluntary agri-environmental engagement. In this regard the collective approach, especially for biodiversity-related measures, seems to be a promising option. It has the potential to increase the effectivity of interventions, while reducing barriers which deter farmers from participating in agri-environmental schemes. In agreement with the participants of the Innovation Lab NRW this innovative contractual solution is in focus regarding the development of a suitable concept, which could serve as a blueprint also for other areas in Germany.

The Innovation Lab North Rhine-Westphalia splits up into the Contract Innovation Lab (CIL NRW) and the Policy Innovation Lab (PIL NRW). The CIL NRW summons regional stakeholders (mainly farmers, advisers and regional administrative representatives) and deals with contract related issues and implementation barriers, while the PIL NRW addresses supra-regional/national policy makers and other relevant stakeholders (NGO´s, Associations etc.) and discusses the broader policy environment accompanying the funding programs.

A Survey Reveals Farmers´ Motivations and Main Concerns

There have been five CIL-workshop and three PIL-workshops conducted to this date. After switching to a digital format due to the Covid-19 situation the attendance of farmers at the CIL-workshops dropped considerably, while the participation of administrative and advisory representatives in the PIL workshops seem to have even grown. To make sure farmers´ perspectives are included in the further development of a concept that should be especially attractive to practitioners, a survey was conducted asking specifically farmers of the region for their opinion on a favourable future agri-environmental funding programme. Altogether 74 farmers from North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) completed the survey, making also good use of the open comment section available for each multiple-choice question, contributing to a rich pool of “in between the lines” ideas and opinions.

Fig. 1: Most important aspects for an increased uptake of AECMs (own survey, completed by 74 farmers of NRW-region)

When asking about the most important aspects that influence the decision to join a scheme, the argument of a less bureaucratic handling of agri-environmental contracting tops the notion of a sufficient financial compensation, making this the most important barrier (see figure 1).

Another important aspect is the need for greater flexibility when implementing measures. Rather than adhering to strict deadlines, there should be some room for pragmatic decision-making especially for some weather-dependent treatments (e.g. sowing or mowing) when meteorological circumstances indicate adverse outcomes. Sometimes also small spatial discrepancies (regarding not only to little but also too much area used for the measure) can lead to rather drastic sanctions. Some farmers noted that especially this strict handling of even minor discrepancies (mostly caused unintentionally) prevents them from joining a scheme. They simply do not want to invite hassle.

Experience from Pilot Projects as a Base for Discussion

Within Germany there are already a few regional pilot projects operating, implementing the collective approach to a varying extent. The last CIl NRW-Workshop mid-September 2021 featured the presentation of a collective action project in Rhineland-Palatine and another one in Saxony-Anhalt. This way the CIL NRW participants were allowed a glimpse into the practical implementation of this approach along with its merits and challenges. Altogether 22 participants joined this 5th (digital) CIL-workshop representing farmers, (regional) agricultural and environmental administration as well as nature conservation organisations. In the discussion part of the workshop, aided by the whiteboard app Mural (see title picture), participants tried to identify the must-have components of an “ideal” collective contract.

Components of the Ideal Contract

There was agreement, that the necessary controls/checks should be reduced to a minimum, since they constitute a considerable hassle for the farmers which costs them time and nerves. The way a pilot project (Saxony-Anhalt) organizes the checks within their collective (checks are carried out, during a time when potential mistakes or failures can still be corrected) is seen as a favourable option by many farmers. To exploit the full potential in terms of farmer support that a collective approach, in theory, has to offer, practitioners feel that a close contact to an assigned field officer/advisor, who “speaks the language of the farmers” would be very helpful.

Another important topic was also the possibility to develop a feasible and fair sanctioning mechanism within a collective. The potential participation in making up the collective´s own general rules or statues has been welcomed by the farmers. The buffer effect, which a collective could potentially introduce to lower the risk of excessive sanctions for the individual farmer, is also a very well perceived advantage of being part of a collective.

How Important is Trust for the Motivation?

Picking up on the argument (“when joining a collective, one is depending on other farmers doing their part”) often used by opponents of a collective, the results of the survey allow for a more optimistic perception of the group effort. Regarding a possible influence of the collective approach on the reliability of the correct implementation of measures, half of the participants say that they feel that their feeling of reliability would rather increase (see Figure 2).

This seems to indicate a general trust towards fellow farmers or at the very least a trust in the mechanisms of social control. This corresponds to results of a study asking Dutch farmers similar questions (see related blogpost). In Contracts2.0, there has been also a scientific study conducted that approached this topic using an experimental setup (“Public Good Games”). The results show that here the willingness to cooperate and the trust among farmers was even greater than experts had predicted (see blogpost).

Fig. 2: Influence of  the collective characteristic on reliability. (own survey, completed by 74 farmers of NRW-Region)

How can Policy Help to Create a Conducive Environment for Collective Action?

The PIL NRW-workshop in November 2021 discussed administrative issues, which are relating to the main barriers regarding a potential implementation of agricultural collectives in Germany. Setting the broader goals and developing a shared vision regarding a certain region and its stakeholders can be challenging when diverse interests have to be taking in account. Ecological necessities need to be aligned with agronomic and economic aspects in order to legitimize the work of the collectives in the eyes of all actors involved. Another important guard rail for this process is the imperative to administer the measures without excessive bureaucracy.

Concerning the documentation and control processes practitioners as well as administrators stressed the need to simplify processes, in order to make participation in agri-environmental programmes more attractive. But contrary to the intention, the New Delivery Model of the Post 2023 CAP will not necessarily offer the longed-for simplification. As one PIL member puts it: “The wish for flexibility is the enemy of simplification”. Under these circumstances the role of the collective in supporting the individual farmer and alleviating the bureaucratic burden, becomes all the more important.

Social Capital and Self-regulation

When thinking about efficient control mechanisms, another thought comes to mind: increasing confidence in a collective’s ability to self-manage and self-regulate would not only help reducing the costs (of multiple reviews of the same aspects), but also increase the bonding social capital of the group (social cohesion; social control; farmers’ trust in the collective to represent their interests) (see blogpost on the topic). To exploit the full potential of a collective implementation in terms of its environmental advantages, but also its socio-economic dynamics, a transfer of more responsibility to the collective could be helpful.

Increased efficiency through Results-based Documentation

In order to ensure that the goals agreed between the collective and the administration are achieved and that the collective approach is thus legitimized and supported by all stakeholders involved, efficient monitoring mechanisms need to be installed. There is still some work to be done here. In order to minimize the on-site inspections of the administration, which are costly for all sides, the use of new technologies (GIS, remote sensing, sentinal data, etc.) should be greatly expanded. These data could be fed into a (further developed) IT-supported and user-friendly documentation and communication system with a uniform frame of reference, which should also be the basis for reporting to the respective higher administrative level (with an increasing degree of abstraction). In this way, the flexibility, but also the efficiency and accuracy of the documentation can be increased and time-consuming micromanagement can be avoided.

Outlook

A question, which needs to be openly discussed, when thinking about rolling out/scaling up the collective approach: what is the advised impelemention depths to enable the full potential of the collective idea. The “exclusiveness” of the Dutch model (to take part in AECM programs at all, farmers need to join a collective) induces some hesitation within German adminstratitive structures as well as with some farmers. Building/maintaining parallel structures, on the other hand, also holds some  disadvantages. This issues needs to be recognized and adressed, before real progress can be made.

The survey addressing farmers of NRW showed a peculiar result regarding the question of how likely it is, that they would join a collective (see figure 3).

Fig. 3: Willingness to join a collective (own survey, completed by 74 farmers of NRW-Region)

The relatively evenly distributed responses indicate a strong heterogeneity in attitudes regarding this novel contracting solution. In addition to pronounced agreement, some farmers appear to have some reservations about this approach. Taking a closer look at the comments on this question in the survey, it appears that these reservations are mainly rooted in concerns about additional bureaucratic (and the corresponding financial) burden.

It would therefore be important to provide farmers as well as administrations with objective information on the subject as well as findings from research & practice and to support the initiation of further pilot projects. Even if this promising approach is not applied across the board in Germany in the foreseeable future, there are some regions which, due to the lack of existing structures, could benefit from an increased effectiveness of agri-environmental funding by applying the cooperative approach. For the farmers, for nature.

Results of the survey (Englisch)

Umfrageergebnisse (Deutsch)

Written by: Christine Hamon, German Farmer´s Association (DBV)

Knowing farmers’ motives helps to strategically address participation

Knowing farmers’ motives helps to strategically address participation

What are the most important motives for farmers to participate in collective schemes? Researchers from Leibniz Centre of Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF) collaborated with BoerenNatuur to ask people involved in the Dutch agricultural collectives about their perception.

Being in close contact with the farmers, the agricultural collectives play a key role in motivating farmers to participate in decision-making, knowledge and capacity building and carrying out measures. For successful landscape management with improvements for nature, it can be important to motivate the “right” farmers. For example, those who manage lands in focus areas or those who always lived in the region and have the best local knowledge. The expectations of the collectives on farmers’ motivations make a difference in the way they approach and recruit farmers.

 

Identifying Key Motives

In order to support the targeted approach in “pushing the right buttons”, researchers from ZALF (Germany) and BoerenNatuur (Netherlands) collaborated on a study to identify the most prominent aspects motivating farmers to enroll in Agri-environmental programs. While the relevant categories for different motivations (Figure 1) were identified via a literature review, their applicability was pre-tested in a workshop. After the relevance of the individual aspects of motivation was confirmed, the framework was the basis of a survey asking the people involved in the collectives to rank the different aspects according to their importance.

Figure 1: Categories of farmer motivations to participate in collective agri-environmental schemes (Barghusen et al. 2021).

Intrinsic Motivation is Equally Important

The results revealed that farmers can be motivated by thinking of costs and benefits from participation: that can be the payments directly, or indirect benefits like support from the dairy sector. But an economic motive is in most cases not the only explanation. Intrinsic motivations, such as personal awareness of nature and problems like biodiversity decline as well as a feeling of personal responsibility can be quite powerful. Respondents of the survey were convinced that these motivations play an equally important role.

Three other categories of motivation were analyzed: There is first the belief in the groups’ effort, that farmers working together can have a greater impact. There is also the aspect of having had long-term experience with working together of some of the agricultural collectives. They often share norms like commitment to nature. And then there is also the aspect of perceived peer pressure, when a farmer is motivated due to the wish to be seen as a good farmer by colleagues.

 

Understanding the Motives Better Helps to Increase Enrollment

We assume that these socially influenced motivations are essential in the collective system, although, in this survey, it remained rather unclear to what extent. Moreover, it may depend on the degree of interaction between actors. Practice, however, shows that many agricultural collectives already strategically engage in facilitating personal exchange and cohesion in the collectives, but also in connecting with local citizens or companies.

The question is whether all collectives are well aware and strategic about diverse motivation of farmers, especially the social dimension? Findings from the survey suggest, that collectives differ in awareness of their role in developing social capital. They could further engage in exchange among each other on how to address economic, personal, and at the same time also social ways in which farmers relate to biodiversity preservation.

For more information as well as details regarding the underlying data please check out the full article.

Written by Rena Barghusen (ZALF, DE)

Photo by Annemieke Dunnink (BoerenNatuur, NL)

Testing MCDM Model to Evaluate the Potential of the Collective Approach

Testing MCDM Model to Evaluate the Potential of the Collective Approach

The Multi-criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method is an excellent tool to assess different options by evaluating conflicting criteria in order to make an informed decision. In Contracts2.0 we are applying this method on evaluating the performance of two case studies implementing the collective approach. Their results show different levels of fulfilling the (sub-)objectives, contributing to the main objective of providing environmental public goods to a varying extent. Comparing the different results can help to identify the weaknesses of certain options and support the design of effective agri-environmental schemes.

This week, C2.0-partners from University of Ljubljana, working on an ex-post analysis of existing collectives, presented a paper about a multi-criteria decision support system which can inform the design and evaluation of novel contractual models by analysing the potential of existing contracts. This paper was presented at the 16th International Symposium on Operational Research in Slovenia from 22nd to 24th September 2021.

Comparing the Performance of the Collectives

The presented research is exploring the sensitivity of the multi criteria decision making model for comparing the potential of different types of coordinated agri-environmental measures (AEM) or collactives. The Dutch Contracts2.0 collective case studys Limburg and Oost Groningen were chosen as subjects for this study. The results are presented with the help of a web chart (Fig.1 and 2). The test model suggests that the two collectives mainly differ in the attributes “social” and “economic” aspects.

Fig. 1: Web chart for the NL_Limburg – attributes

Fig. 2: Web chart for  NL_Oost Groningen – attributes

Collectives show different Performance Levels

Fig. 3 shows a more detailed breakdown of the differences by criteria. If we take a closer look at the economic factor in both cases, we see that the NL_Limburg case has both criteria for the “economic” attribute very poorly assessed. The SWOT analysis (from which the original information about the characteristics of these two cases stems from) showed that there is practically no cost reduction for farmers in NL-Limburg case arising from joining the collective. In contrast, the NL_Oost Groningen collective provides an organized group purchase of seedlings and seeds to ensure a better price and thus receiving a better economic assessment.

Fig. 1: Web chart for the NL_Limburg – attributes

Weaknesses of the Model Need to be Addressed

In this test model, the equal weight for factors and individual decision-making approach was used, which eventually, reflected in the lack of sensitivity of the test model and should be corrected in the final decision model.

The final decision model will compare nine different case studies implementing the collective approach to AEM. It will not use an equal weight for factors, instead the analytical hierarchy process pair wise comparison method for calculation of weights assigned to factors will be made with a combination of Delfi method. Delfi method includes several expert’s view and can reflect a group decision making effort so at the end a consensus for assigning weights to factors will be made.

The final decision model will be applied for selected case study sites in order to identify the contracts with the highest probability to provide the desired provision of environmental public goods (EPG) and ecosystem services along with marketable agricultural private goods. It will show weaknesses and strengths for each individual case study and it will give insight into the factors that can have greatest effect to the provision of EPG. This will then be applicable as a new knowledge for the design of the novel contracts for EPG that the Contracts2.0 project is all about.

For more detailed information have a look at our paper, which we presented at the 16th International Symposium on Operational Research.

Written by: Janja Rudolf & Andrej Udovč, Biotechnical faculty, University of Ljubljana (Slovenia)

Farmers’ Perceptions of Payment by Results scheme in UK

Farmers’ Perceptions of Payment by Results scheme in UK

Earlier this year, researchers from the UK ‘Contracts2.0’ team spent some time working with Natural England and the Yorkshire Dales National Park’s Pilot Results Based Agri-environment Payment Scheme (RBAPS) to study farmers’ perceptions of this results-based pilot project. Another focus of the joint study was to identify the changes to the management practices as well as the habitat quality of the farmland resulting from the participation in this results-based scheme.

 We found that farmers had very positive experiences of the payments by results scheme and, overall, habitat quality was at a comparable level to control sites in conventional agri-environmental agreements. This can be seen as a success considering the relatively short timescale of the project and the additional empowerment of farmers within PBR approaches. Interestingly, many farmers chose to maintain many of their existing management practices, rather than aim to improve the habitat quality as we might expect in a results-based system. Farmers recognised a relationship between their existing habitat quality and the cultural & environmental heritage of the landscape, where unique elements of the area such as ancient flower meadows resulted in sufficient payments. Farmers also noted some important factors outside of their control which impacted management, from the weather conditions to the valuable advice and support received from local project officers.

Our report was submitted to the UK Government’s Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, as a part of the supplementary evidence relating to the ongoing RBAPS trial and development of the new Environmental Land Management Schemes (ELMS) in England.

Project Outline

We conducted detailed interviews with farmers involved in the RBAPS pilot in January 2021. The interviews lasted on average for approximately 1 hour 30 minutes, with the shortest interview being just over 1 hour and the longest being 2 hours and 30 minutes. The interviews took place either online via video call (on Skype, Microsoft Teams, Zoom or WhatsApp) or over the telephone. To ‘map’ the farmers’ land management timelines and to compare any changes to management before and during the pilot, we used an interactive online platform called Mural to show farmers the timeline as we were making it. The RBAPS pilot in Wensleydale and Coverdale is focused on Grassland habitats for breeding waders and species rich hay meadows. The upland environments of many of England’s National Parks, and across the UK’s CIL area in the Contracts project, are in many ways ideal landscapes for the delivery of these types of environmental public goods, alongside numerous others.

Figure: Example of a Land Management Timeline made during the interview on Mural

Land Management Approaches in Results-Based Schemes

Motivations and Objectives in Results-based Approaches

One of the most important factors we identified through our in-depth interviews was a distinction between farmers who aim to ‘improve’ habitat quality and those who aim to ‘maintain’ it through results-based schemes. This distinction between ‘improvers’ and ‘maintainers’ appeared both in terms of motives for habitat quality and the management strategies the farmers employed. The objective of maintaining habitat quality might appear to run counter to the conventional assumption in results-based approaches that farmers will be incentivised to ‘do more to get more’. Though initially surprising, farmers explained that their reasoning for maintaining habitats were many-sided and varied from the short-term scope of the pilot to the existing relatively high standard of their habitats, detailed further below. 

Figure: Tracing Farmers’ Land Management Goals in PBR

Environmental Heritage in Protected Areas

Where we found that many farmers were content to maintain the quality of the habitats that they already had, several farmers said that some long-existing cultural environmental features of these habitats, which are unique to protected landscapes, were reasons for their existing good standard. So, where farmers have sought to maintain existing habitats, alongside pragmatic factors of management, they also emphasised the already high-value heritage features of their habitats. These include features more common in National Landscapes, such as

  • long-existing uncultivated hay meadows with rare and ancient seeds,
  • local & traditional land and animal management practices such as making small hay bales
  • locally unique cultural and environmental landscape features such as hay barns

To illustrate, hay barns, for example, are not only highly valued by tourists as beautiful, picturesque features of the Yorkshire Dales National Park, they also hold an important traditional role in practices of small hay bale making, as they enable farmers to house the hay close to the place it was made and where it will be needed for livestock in winter months. Furthermore, this process is one of the most environmentally friendly practices of producing storable forage: the ‘tedding’ (or drying process) redisperses seeds across the meadow. Traditional small bale hay making also avoids issues of soil compaction, where larger bales necessitate heavier machinery, and remove the use of plastic, which is needed to wrap grass for fermentation in silage or haylage production. Therefore, we can see that many of these ‘environmental heritage’ features have both environmentally and culturally valuable qualities which are unique to England’s protected landscapes. 

 

Figure: Hay Barns in Wensleydale (Image © James LePage)

Administration and Support in a Results-Based Pilot

Another factor which was universally identified by farmers as a huge benefit of the results-based approach was the scheme administration. Beyond the highly valued simplicity and flexibility offered by results-based contracts (in contrast to the demanding and complicated paperwork of England’s existing action-based schemes) farmers also emphasised the key role that the National Park Authority (NPA) officers played in scheme support and delivery. Farmers highlighted that the role of the NPA’s local officers in scheme design, information provision, training, and dialogue was fundamental to scheme uptake and success. For the broader developments of results-based schemes, local or regional organisations such as NPAs are, in many ways, well placed to be important intermediary facilitating bodies for these roles.

Issues out of their control: Adverse weather

Farmers also emphasised their habitats’ vulnerability to the impact of the weather, including extreme flooding or conversely, unexpected dry spells. Almost all the farmers made several comments about the negative effect of the weather, particularly when this was combined with differing assessment timings, upon their habitat scores. This vulnerability has important consequences for ‘pure’ results-based schemes, and indicates that ‘hybrid’ schemes, which combine results and action-based, might help to reduce some of the risk to farmers from issues outside of their control.

Disseminating our results

Following our interviews and analysis, we complied a detailed report which was submitted to DEFRA alongside Natural England’s main summary of the Pilot to date. We were also delighted to present some of our recent research into participant farmers’ opinions on payments by results as a part of a national conference ‘Farming with Nature’. This conference, convened by the University of Cumbria, aimed to explore how nature can be delivered within our farmed ‘National Landscapes’, namely England’s main protected areas such as National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs). This approach was a key recommendation from the Landscapes Review.

Future Directions for Wensleydale RBAPS

The pilot is currently running under another extension funded by DEFRA and is exploring alongside the participating farmers how future schemes might work better: Either as ‘hybrid’ schemes which combine elements of action and results-based approaches, or at varying scales which might plan agreements at farm or even landscape levels, rather than individual field parcels.

For more information read our full report regarding Farmers’ Experiences of Results-based contracts in Wensleydale or contact me at Jennifer.dodsworth@abdn.ac.uk or @JennyferDods on Twitter.

Featured Image:  © James LePage

Implementing innovative contract models – results from the Policy Delphi

Implementing innovative contract models – results from the Policy Delphi

The second round of our online Policy Delphi study – focusing on opportunities to implement innovative contract models in the current policy arena – was closed during the summer, and the first results are just fresh out of the oven.

A key characteristic of the Delphi method is that it runs in several consecutive rounds. This allows the researchers to use the findings from the preceding rounds to design questions in the forthcoming rounds. This allows to dig a little deeper into the most exciting (often controversial) topics, which is exactly what happened in Contracts2.0. The results of our first Delphi round were analysed to identify converging and contested topics, which were then turned into questions and statements to test in the second round of the survey. 32 experts from 15 European countries participated in the second round, with almost half of them indicated to have direct policy experience at national or subnational level.

Based on the answers from the first round on how the ideal contract would look like to incentivize farmers for more sustainable farming we could synthesize three prototypes: a) a mixed contract combining action-based and result-based elements, signed bi-laterally between farmers and funding agencies for a medium duration (5-7 years); b) a result-based contract, signed between a group of farmers (collective) and the funding agency, with flexible duration (from short to medium or long term); and c) a value-chain contract, signed between farmers and other actors of the value chain (e.g. food processors, retailers, certifiers), which builds on an existing AECM contract and provides a price premium for more sustainable products. As the figure (above) suggests, the majority of the respondents would choose a mixed, action- and results-based contract for an European level contract prototype, but still almost one-quarter of the respondents would suggest alternative contracts, mainly ones which offer more flexibility to choose collective (landscape-level) agreements or different contract lengths from shorter to longer term.

We also asked what the best way is to implement these novel contracts, and there seems to be an agreement about agri-environmental-and climate measures still being the main target area, where innovative contract characteristics can be implemented as top-ups or additional payments to more mainstream conventional (i.e. action-based) contracts. In terms of funding novel contracts through the Common Agricultural Policy, responding experts underlined the outstanding importance of the Pillar 2 payments. Within Pillar 2 policy instruments, almost 70% of the participants pointed to agri-environmental and climate measures, while voluntary interventions in Pillar 2 for investment, knowledge exchange and cooperation, as well as for ecological constraints were listed by 34.5%. Eco-schemes, which is a part of the new green architecture affiliated with the Pillar 1 payments, were also mentioned by 34.5% of the respondents – with this proportion, eco-schemes seem to be the most promising instrument within Pillar 1 with a considerable potential to integrate innovative contracts.

As we learned from the first round of the Delphi study, available budget is a strong constraint for implementing innovative contracts (beside others, like increased transaction costs or higher uncertainties). Financially supporting environmentally friendly farming through different instruments of the CAP, as suggested by the findings shared above, can be a strategy to alleviate the budget burden. However, it raises further questions such as additionality and potential double-payments received for the same result from different schemes. Fostering coherence within the CAP and between the CAP and other policy areas is a key step forward and will also be a focal topic of the third round of our Delphi study.

written by Eszter Kelemen & Boldizsár Megyesi (ESSRG)

 For more information see the Report of the 2nd Round of the Delphi Study.

For infos on tools and techniques for initiating a policy dialogue on innovative approaches check our Practice Abstracts no. 10